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Adam Moore, Privacy and Government Surveillance: WikiLeaks and the new Accountability

Adam Moore, Privacy and Government Surveillance: WikiLeaks and the new Accountability

Comment by: Colin Koopman

PLSC 2011

Published version available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1980812

Workshop draft abstract:

This working paper considers the ‘new accountability’ forced upon corporations and governments by information sharing sites like WikiLeaks.  I will argue that accessing and sharing sensitive information about individuals, corporations, and governments is – in the typical case – morally suspect.  Nevertheless, the wrongness of cases like WikiLeaks is mitigated by two factors.  First, in democratic societies we have a right to know much of the information published by these sharing sites – information that in many instances is unjustifiably withheld by governments.  Second, this sort of sharing is forcing a realignment of power.  For decades corporations and governments have been able to collect, store, and share information about ordinary citizens while walling off access to their own information.  Sharing sites like WikiLeaks are changing this balance of power. And while I agree that “two wrongs don’t make a right” – accessing, storing, and sharing information about citizens and accessing, storing, and sharing information about government activities – for this slogan to be true one has acknowledge the first wrong.

Deirdre Mulligan & Colin Koopman, A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Theories of Privacy

Deirdre Mulligan & Colin Koopman, A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Theories of Privacy

Comment by: Harry Surden

PLSC 2010

Workshop draft abstract:

The concept of privacy, despite its centrality for contemporary liberal democratic culture, is remarkably ill-understood.  We face today an almost dizzying array of diverging and conflicting theorizations, conceptualizations, diagnoses, and analyses of privacy.

These multiple senses of privacy provoke uncertainty about the concept and attendant charges of ambiguity and vagueness.  Despite the uncertainty of privacy being a cause for concern, we argue here that the conceptual plurality of privacy with which we are faced today positively answers to the dynamic and diverse functions that privacy performs in our culture.  In order to appreciate the positive benefits of privacy’s plurality, however, we need to undertake inquiries into the various ways in which our conceptions of privacy differ from one another.  Our primary claim is that the multiple dimensions along which concepts of privacy vary demand careful scrutiny and evaluation.

Short of that, we may too easily find ourselves overwhelmed with an abundance of claims concerning privacy, and this abundance may induce a dizzying rather than a dynamic uncertainty.  The article proceeds as follows.  Section 1 presents an introduction to the plurality of privacy.  Section 2 argues on behalf of a multi-dimensional taxonomy for privacy theories that would enable us to work with privacy concepts in a more nuanced manner than is typical.  Section 3 presents a categorization of extant theories of privacy according to this taxonomy and Section 4 explicates these theories.  Section 5 offers a brief conclusion about the potential upside of our multi-dimensional approach.

Marcy Peek, The Observer and the Observed: Re-imagining Privacy Dichotomies in Information Privacy Law

Marcy Peek, The Observer and the Observed: Re-imagining Privacy Dichotomies in Information Privacy Law

Comment by: Colin Koopman

PLSC 2009

Published version available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1492231

Workshop draft abstract:

Information privacy law and scholarship has drawn a false dichotomy between those who violate privacy (the “observers” or “watchers”) and those who have their privacy violated (the “observed” or the “watched.”)  From the Orwellian concept of Big Brother (in the book 1984) in which everyone is watched at virtually all times, theoretical conceptions of privacy moved to the Foucault-ian notion of the Panopticon, as expressed concretely in the early nineteenth century by Jeremy Bentham.   His concept of the Panopticon was of a prison, circular in architectural design, that had at its center at a watch guard tower rising above the circular prison.   The key aspect of the Panopticon was the central watch guard tower, which was designed with blackened windows that allowed the guards to see out, but disallowed the prisoners to see in.  Thus, the prisoners could not know whether or when the guards were watching them at any given moment.  This created a situation of perfect surveillance and perfect control, for the prisoners had no idea at any given time whether the guards were watching or even whether the guards were in the tower at all.   In fact, no one had to be in the tower at any given time — for the prisoners knew that they might be surveilled — or not — at any moment of the day or night.    These Orwellian, Foucault-ian, and Bentham-ian notions of privacy centered around the dichotomous concept of the observer vs. the observed, or the watcher vs. the watched.    None of these notions — which are fundamentally notions of surveillance — take into account — the more fluid concept of the observed and the observer mutually engaging in observation or — to put it another way — both parties (whether consensually or not) watching each other.   Information privacy law generally assumes that a person usually wants privacy and that there is a watcher-watched relationship in which a watcher invades a person’s privacy (legally or not).   But that assumption is driven by the false dichotomy between the observed and the observer and an erroneous assumption that the observed generally desires privacy vis-à-vis the observer.  Once we push at the borders of these assumptions, we begin to understand that privacy relations are more nuanced than often portrayed by information privacy law and scholarship.   For example, as technology progresses and examples such as webcams (one-way or two-way), reality shows, long-range imaging devices, video-enhanced cell phones, easily accessible personal information via Internet databases or social networking sites, etc. become commonplace, the meanings of privacy are altered, and we all take on multiple, shifting roles of the watcher and the watched at various times.    In effect, we are all watching each other.   This new paradigm has a myriad of implications for conceptions of privacy.   For example, if one value of privacy is self-development, and the concept of self-development in a less complicated environment of relatively stable observed/observer relations is no longer the norm, then self-development becomes less about privacy and more about constructing identity and the presentation of self in everyday life (see, e.g., Erving Goffman’s works).  Indeed, as technology progresses, we all end up in the roles of the watcher and the watched, whether simultaneously or at distinct points in time.    As quantum physics teaches us, the knowledge that observation is taking places changes the behavior of the observed; because observation is ubiquitous in the modern, technological world, our conceptions of normative values such as self-development, reasonable expectations of privacy, the privacy torts, and privacy mandates embodied in federal and state law might need to be re-imagined.