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Christopher Slobogin, The Future of the Fourth Amendment in a Technological Age

Christopher Slobogin, The Future of the Fourth Amendment in a Technological Age

Comment by: Dorothy Glancy

PLSC 2011

Published version available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1734755

Workshop draft abstract:

The Fourth Amendment is becoming increasingly irrelevant as technology expands police capacity to intrude.   Supreme Court jurisprudence defining “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes—the public exposure doctrine, the general public use doctrine, the contraband-specific doctrine and the assumption of risk doctrine—leaves a vast number of technologically-enhanced search techniques unregulated.  Special needs doctrine leaves many other technological searches, especially those of groups, essentially unregulated. Yet the damage to privacy and related interests caused by these “virtual searches” can be just as significant as the harm associated with physical searches.  Two reforms are proposed.  Where police target a particular individual, innuendo in Supreme Court decisions that “search” might eventually be defined as a layperson would and that the justification for searches should be proportionate to the degree of invasion can form the basis for a regulatory regime that provides meaningful privacy protection without handcuffing the police.  When, instead, government uses technology to conduct mass searches, political process theory—less deferential to law enforcement than special needs doctrine, but more deferential than strict scrutiny analysis—may provide the optimal method of cabining government power.

Amy Gajda, Privacy Before The Right to Privacy: Truthful Libel and the Earliest Underpinnings of the Privacy Tort

Amy Gajda, Privacy Before The Right to Privacy: Truthful Libel and the Earliest Underpinnings of the Privacy Tort

Comment by: Dorothy Glancy

PLSC 2009

Workshop draft abstract:

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis are widely credited with spurring the creation of legal protection for personal privacy in the United States. Their 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy, lambasted what the two authors considered sensational and invasive newspaper coverage and, it is often said, laid the foundation for modern privacy law, including the tort remedy for Publication of Private Facts.  This Article, however, traces the underpinnings of that tort protection back long before Warren and Brandeis’ landmark article.  Even before the two law partners famously slammed journalism and suggested that journalists be punished for publishing stories regarding private behavior, courts in the United States had both recognized the value of personal privacy and strongly condemned journalists for their invasive practices.  This Article explores those early legal foundations and suggests why Warren and Brandeis may have elected not to enlist this precedent in support of their cause:  some of the rulings most relevant to expanded legal protection against invasive news coverage are pointedly aligned with past abuses of legal power, including the infamous Star Chamber.