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Jane Bambauer and Derek Bambauer, Vanished

By privacylaw | Posted on

Jane Bambauer and Derek Bambauer, Vanished

Comment by: Eric Goldman

PLSC 2013

Published version available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326236

Workshop draft abstract:

The conventional wisdom on Internet censorship assumes that the United States government makes fewer attempts to remove and delist content from the Internet than other democracies. Likewise, democratic governments are believed to make fewer attempts to control on-line content than the governments of non-democratic countries. These assumptions are theoretically sound: most democracies have express commitments to the freedom of speech and communication, and the United States has exceptionally strong legal immunities for Internet content providers, along with judicial protection of free speech rights that make it unique even among democracies. However, the conventional wisdom is not entirely correct. A country’s system of governance does not predict well how it will seek to regulate on-line material. And democracies, including the United States, engage in far more extensive censorship of Internet communication than is commonly believed.

This Article explores the gap between free speech rhetoric and practice by analyzing data recently released by Google that describes the official requests or demands to remove content made to the company by a government between 2010 and 2012. Controlling for Internet penetration and Google’s relative market share in each country, we examine international trends in the content removal demands. Specifically, we explore whether some countries have a propensity to use unenforceable requests or demands to remove content, and whether these types of extra-legal requests have increased over time. We also examine trends within content categories to reveal the differences in priorities among governments. For example, European Union governments more frequently seek to remove content for privacy reasons. More surprisingly, the United States government makes many more demands to remove content for defamation, even after controlling for population and Internet penetration.

The Article pays particular attention to government requests to remove content based upon claims regarding privacy, defamation, and copyright enforcement. We make use of more detailed data prepared specially for our study that shows an increase in privacy-related requests following the European Commission’s draft proposal to create a Right To Be Forgotten.

Eric Goldman, In Defense of 47 U.S.C. §230

By privacylaw | Posted on

Eric Goldman, In Defense of 47 U.S.C. §230

Comment by: Deirdre Mulligan

PLSC 2011

Workshop draft abstract:

47 U.S.C. §230 is the most important Cyberlaw statute, but it keeps adding new critics.  This Essay responds to those critics by analyzing a previously under-explored policy justification for the statute.  230 works because it enables online publishers to obtain non-public information about marketplace offerings and publish that information in ways that help consumers make better decisions.  As a result, 230 helps the marketplace’s “invisible hand” work more effectively—a crucial social benefit that we should not jeopardize by modifying the statute.

Eric Goldman, Reputational Information: A Research Agenda

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Eric Goldman, Reputational Information: A Research Agenda

Comment by: Jens Grossklags

PLSC 2009

Published version available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1754628

Workshop draft abstract:

This paper looks at the supply, demand and regulation of reputational information.  I define “reputational information” as information about an individual or company’s past performance that helps a decision-maker predict the individual or company’s future performance.  Reputational information plays a critical role in marketplaces because it can help reward good producers and punish poor performers.  As a result, any defect in the supply or demand of reputational information can seriously distort the marketplace generally.

My first observation is that consumers know lots of valuable reputational information but that information does not help other consumers make marketplace decisions so long as it remains private information.  Consumers do “communicate” their views through their marketplace decisions (such as continuing as a repeat customer, or switching to a new option), but each individual consumer’s decision is often not readily observable by other consumers, and the rationales for consumer decision-making (such as why the consumer chose one product or competitor over others) is rarely publicly available either.  The marketplace mechanism might improve with better supply of this private information.

My second observation is that many reputational systems exist, but they are regulated quite differently.  For example, compare credit scores, where both supply and demand are heavily regulated, with recommendation letters, which are virtually unregulated.  This heterogeneity of regulatory structures for reputational systems raises some questions.  Why the differences?  Can we use our experiences with one reputational system to craft better regulations of other reputational systems?

Expanding on these two observations, this paper will have four parts.  The first part will inventory the various types of reputational systems and describe their similarities and differences.  The second part will consider supply factors of reputational information, including how financial incentives can stimulate production, how disincentives (such as the threat of legal action for providing negative comments) may suppress supply, the credibility of reputational information (including pay-for-play and how supplying reputational information affect the supplier’s reputation), the role of intermediaries and the role of anonymity.

The third part will consider demand factors of reputational information, including credibility concerns of consumers of reputational information (and how consumers reduce transaction costs by “outsourcing” reputational assessments), privacy concerns and the potential for consumers to misinterpret aggregated reputational information.

The final part will develop policy guidelines for regulatory intervention into the supply and demand of reputational information.  This part will conclude by identifying situations where the heterogeneity of current regulatory structures might be suboptimal.