Monthly Archives: May 2013

David Flaherty, Reflections on Reform of the Federal Privacy Act

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David Flaherty, Reflections on Reform of the Federal Privacy Act

Comment by: Michael Geist

PLSC 2009

Workshop draft abstract:

While the Privacy Act was accurately regarded as a progressive privacy statement in the early 1980s, it must now be considered an outdated Act that no longer properly regulates how federal institutions collect, use, retain and disclose personal information. Reform of the Privacy Act should be made to appeal unanimously to the media, public servants, the political elite, the government of the day, and Members of Parliament. A primary goal of this article is to advance thinking about how to motivate such necessary change and to advance the cause of reform of the Privacy Act on the basis that such analysis and transformation is long overdue. And, in order to have robust implementation of such a reformed law, Parliament also has to mandate a structure for privacy risk management in each federal institution, including, inter alia, the establishment of Chief Privacy Officers, Privacy Impact Assessments, and on-line privacy training.

Mary Fan, Quasi-Privacy and Redemption in a World of Ubiquitous Checking-Up

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Mary Fan, Quasi-Privacy and Redemption in a World of Ubiquitous Checking-Up

Comment by: Deven Desai

PLSC 2009

Workshop draft abstract:

The solace of those who stumble or free-fall after making a mistake or enduring misfortune is the ability to remake oneself.  The possibility of remaking oneself is one of the casualties of the rampant and insufficiently regulated proliferation of private-sector databases that ossify and construct identity — and impede recovery and self-remaking after traumas like foreclosure, bankruptcy or lesser mistakes and mishaps such as an long-unpaid or mislaid bill scarring a credit score.  Classically, one who suffered a substantial setback might hope that time and effort would expunge or alter natural memory or a geographical move might permit a fresh start beyond the reach of localized memory.  The difficulty with the proliferation of private-sector databases is that memory is artificially prolonged, bureaucratically ossified, and extended in geographical reach, severely circumscribing the ability to remake or rehabilitate oneself.

This article conceptualizes privacy as protecting the plasticity—in the sense of ability to recover from injury—of identity and personhood and the life consequences that flow from identity.  Our understanding of what privacy entails has been crucially updated for the information age by Dan Solove as more than just safeguard against intrusion on what is secret, but also “the ability to avoid the powerlessness of having others control information” affecting critical life consequences like loans, jobs and licensing, and further humanized by Anita Allen to include protection against perpetually dredging up the past so that one can move forward and rehabilitate. The conception of privacy as self-plasticity builds on these understanding.  The article argues that conceptualized thus, privacy as principle and right requires the regulation of memory in the context of private-sector databases to permit attempts at self-remaking and rehabilitation.  Memory regulation would translate into protections like mandatory expungement of records or circumscribing the geographical scope of database information to permit the possibility of self-remaking and rehabilitation.

Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Net Responsibility in Democracies

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Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Net Responsibility in Democracies

Comment by: Christopher Wolf

PLSC 2009

Published version available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650702

Workshop draft abstract

The Internet’s design and raison d’être are complete freedom, but soon enough people began to exploit the Net’s massive potential to enhance partisan interests, some of which are harmful and anti-social. As can be expected, given that the Internet has been a part of our lives for a relatively short time, the discussions concentrate on the social production, technological, architectural, geographical aspects of the Net. The discussions about the costs and harms of the Internet, and how to address them, are – on the other hand – in their infancy. The transnational nature of the World-Wide-Web and its vast content make regulation very difficult, some say virtually impossible.

In this paper I wish to address the ethical, social and legal problems rooted in technology in response to potential risks on the Internet. The Internet is not the problem. The problem arises where it is utilized to undermine our well-being as autonomous beings living in free societies. This study focuses on articulating possible solutions to specific problems and on providing a framework within which these problems can be addressed and resolved. It strives to suggest an approach informed by the experiences of democratic societies with different norms and legal cultures; one that harnesses the capacities of the public and private sectors in reaching viable, practical solutions.

In the focus of my discussion are the neglected concepts of moral responsibility and of social responsibility, adopting them to the Internet realm. I will discuss and explain the concepts and their implications on people and society. I then address the issue of moral and social responsibilities of Net users (agents), focusing, inter alia, on the tragic story of Megan Meier. Next I move on to discuss the responsibilities of ISPs and web-host companies. Should they take effort to monitor their sites for such information or are they relieved of any responsibility? This is arguably the most intriguing and complex issue of Net responsibility. I argue that ISPs and web-hosting companies should aspire to take responsibility for content, and that they should respect and abide by the laws of the countries in which they operate. The dream of a medium that transcends geographical borders and facilitates unlimited and inexpensive access to consumers without any regulatory restrictions is over.  A case in point is LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo! France (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 22 May 2000). Next I turn to the issue of readers’ moral and social responsibilities: Responsibility of people who encounter malicious postings on the Internet, some of which might be damaging and harmful. Should they simply read the postings and move on or do something about it? Then I discuss state responsibility and finally reflect on the responsibility of the international community. I argue for international cooperation to address international concerns.:

 

Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age

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Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age

Comment by: Ian Kerr

PLSC 2009

Workshop draft abstract:

Youth are allowed mistakes in greater measure than adults.  Today, however, because of the digital medium, youthful exuberance and  experiment, intellectual curiosity, and teenage rebellion may be subject to the prying eyes of authorities, both governmental and private, both contemporaneously and far into the future.  The disciplinary effects of such possible future ramifications may be graver today than ever before. The consequences may be particularly severe for women, given societal practices related to sexuality. What might the law do to protect youthfulness in youth?

Lisa Campbell, Relational Surveillance: Aboriginal experience, scopaethesia and nanotechnology

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Lisa Campbell, Relational Surveillance: Aboriginal experience, scopaethesia and nanotechnology

Comment by: Annie Anton

PLSC 2009

Workshop draft abstract:

This article will examine privacy as a collective right, and consider the relevance of anonymity in the public sphere.

It will explore the work of biologists who have done research on the sense of being watched, and in particular experiments that have shown that group behavior is modified when surveillance mechanisms are put in place.

Using the example of Aboriginal groups in Canada, the article will consider who the collection and use of personal information is affecting this population.

The article will analyze developments in technology that are altering the divide between public and private spheres, and focus on two in particular: 1) increasing access to the www via interactive handheld devices, and 2) data collection and creation via molecular computing.

Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: On the Limitations of Privacy and Technology Scholarship

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Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: On the Limitations of Privacy and Technology Scholarship

Comment by: Andrea Matwyshyn

PLSC 2009

Published version available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1458637

Workshop draft abstract:

Scholarship around privacy often reacts to and contextualizes advances in technology.  Scholars disagree about whether and how particular technologies implicate privacy, however, and certain technologies with potentially serious ramifications for privacy can avoid scrutiny entirely.

Consider a growing trend in user interface design, that of building “social” interfaces with natural language capabilities and other anthropomorphic signifiers.  An extensive literature in communications and psychology demonstrates that artificial social agents elicit strong subconscious reactions, including the feeling of being observed or evaluated. Adding a social layer to the technologies we use to investigate or navigate the world, or introducing apparent agents into spaces historically reserved for solitude, has important implications for privacy.  These techniques need not entail any collection, processing, or dissemination of information, however, and hence fall outside even the broadest and most meticulous contemporary accounts of privacy harm.

This paper argues for a new master test for privacy invasive technology.  Specifically, I argue that for any given technology, we should look to three interrelated factors: perception of observation, actual observation, and independent consequence.  Dissecting the effects of technology along these three lines will help clarify why, and to what extent, a given technology or technique implicates privacy.  This approach differs from the standard discussion of privacy invasive technology in terms of the collection, processing, and dissemination of information.  It has the advantage of capturing certain conservative intuitions espoused by courts and commentators, such as the view that the mere collection or processing of data by a computer can at most “threaten” privacy, and uncovers situations wherein notice itself triggers a violation.  Yet the approach is not reductionist overall: the proposed test elevates the importance of victim perspective and captures a previously undertheorized category of privacy harm.

Ann Bartow, Virtual Women

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Ann Bartow, Virtual Women

Comment by: Danielle Citron

PLSC 2009

Workshop draft abstract:

In most contexts, women are less visible and less present than men in the performing arts, and in any commercial enterprise that exploits creative copyrightable endeavors.  Female creative output commands less attention and less money than the creative works of men, and women are less visible, and receive less compensation than male counterparts when they collaborate in the production of creative works with men. Male writers, male singers, male visual artists, male actors, male directors and producers, male composers, male architects, and other male authors of almost any form of copyrightable work dominate the cultural terrain, and acquire and control a substantial majority of the financial resources that creative works accrue.   This gendered phenomenon is observable in real space, and mirrored in cyberspace. The only exceptions are contexts in which women function as commodities for consumption. This paper will focus on one of them: Online periodicals that chronicle on the lives of celebrities. It will then chart the consequences that the norms created by these periodicals have for all women.

Alessandro Acquisti, The Impact of Relative Standards on Concern about Privacy

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Alessandro Acquisti, The Impact of Relative Standards on Concern about Privacy

Comment by: Lauren Willis

PLSC 2009

Workshop draft abstract:

Consumers consistently rank privacy high among their concerns, yet their behaviors often reveal a remarkable lack of regard for the protection of personal information.  We propose that one explanation for the discrepancy is that actual concern about privacy in a particular situation depends on comparative judgments.  We present the results of two studies that illustrate the comparative nature of privacy-related behavior.  The first study focuses on the impact of receiving information about self-revelations made by others on an individual’s own self-revelatory behavior. The second study focuses on the impact of past intrusions on privacy on current self-revelatory behavior.  We find that admission to sensitive and even unethical behaviors by others elicits information disclosure, and that increasing the sensitivity of questions over the course of a survey inhibits information disclosure. Together, these studies can help explain why people profess great concern about privacy yet behave in a fashion that bespeaks a lack of concern.