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Anjali S. Dalal, Administrative Constitutionalism and the Development of the Surveillance State

Anjali S. Dalal, Administrative Constitutionalism and the Development of the Surveillance State

Comment by: Michael Traynor

PLSC 2013

Published version available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236502

Workshop draft abstract:

Administrative constitutionalism is a theory that promotes and protects laws that reflect the deliberative process.  It is a flavor of popular constitutionalism that values the multi-year conversations among the various branches of government, levels of government, and the public, reflecting the evolution and slow entrenchment of a set of norms.  For administrative constitutionalists, it is the dialogic process that lends legitimacy to the norm that ultimately evolves and become entrenched.

However, one of the dangers of administrative constitutionalism in practice is that of entrenchment before deliberation. Agencies, in their role as norm entrepreneurs, can develop and, over time, entrench norms before those norms have the opportunity to emerge from the deliberative process.  This situation threatens to create legitimacy based on historical practice and path dependency, not deliberation and consensus building.

This article provides an account of administrative constitutionalism at its best and its worst, by tracing the history of the creation and evolution of the Attorney General Guidelines, the governing document for the FBI.  In particular, this article looks at the defining features that led to the early success and later failure of administrative constitutionalism in practice and attempts to articulate the administrative architecture needed to ensure that the reality of administrative constitutionalism reflects the deliberative and democratic promise of the theory.

The article begins with a brief summary of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory of administrative constitutionalism.  Part I provides an account of domestic surveillance law that demonstrates the power and promise of administrative constitutionalism.  In this Part, I trace the growth of the FBI’s domestic surveillance practices from its early years until the development of the FBI’s first governing document, the

Attorney General Guidelines.  This document reflected the tenor of the time and a high point in the FBI’s protection of First Amendment rights in the face of competing national security concerns. Part II provides an account of the subsequent iterations of the Attorney

General Guidelines that illustrates the dangers of agency norm entrepreneurship and entrenchment gone unchecked.  In this Part, I detail the historical evolution of the Guidelines and attendant shift in the balance between free speech and national security, in favor of national security.  This shift occurs with neither the input of the other branches of government nor the public, but is encouraged by the norm entrenchment that follows, reflecting a failure of administrative constitutionalism in practice.  This failure is marked by the return of the three dominant features of the Hoover FBI — the unchecked expansion of the FBI’s mission, the pursuit of mission through illegal or potentially illegal means, and the creation of an intelligence gathering process cloaked in secrecy.  Part III suggests a few structural changes to help architect against future failures of administrative constitutionalism.  In particular, Part III explores the appropriate role of Congressional oversight, judicial intervention, and agency accountability to ensure the success of administrative constitutionalism.

Helen Nissenbaum, Amanda Conley, Anupam Datta, Divya Sharma, The Obligation of Courts to Post Records Online: A Multidisciplinary Study

Helen Nissenbaum, Amanda Conley, Anupam Datta, Divya Sharma, The Obligation of Courts to Post Records Online: A Multidisciplinary Study

Comment by: Michael Traynor

PLSC 2011

Published version available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112573

Workshop draft abstract:

On the face of it, what could be complicated about placing public court records online? After all, courts are obliged to make these records publicly available—shouldn’t they do so as effectively and efficiently as possible, offering a digitized collection on the Web? Indeed, the advent of PACER for the Federal Court System suggests that the matter has been settled.  Yet at state and local levels around the country, where some of the records richest in personal information are found, privacy concerns have brought this controversial prospect to the fore. Courts continue to grapple with it drafting new administrative rules and looking for guidance in constitutional, legislative, and common law sources, legal scholarship, as well as their own past practices and those of peer institutions.

The paper I am proposing for PLSC 2011 will report on findings of a collaborative project with Amanda Conley, Anupam Datta, and Divya Sharma on the normative question of placing court records online. Drawing on notable work by legal scholars Grayson Barber, Natalie Gomez-Velez, Daniel Solove, and Peter Winn, among others, and focusing on state civil courts, our project asks whether courts have an obligation to post on the Web, for open and unconditional access, records that traditionally have been made available in hard copy from court houses or electronically via local terminals. Guided by the framework of contextual integrity, we map, in detail, the differences in flow afforded by online placement and in so doing, make precise what others have attempted to capture with terms such as “hyper-dissemination” and “practical obscurity”. For the normative analysis, we compare local and online of dissemination in terms of how well they serve values, ends, and purposes attributed to courts, such as dispute resolution, justice and fairness, and accountability.

We reach the surprising (though tentative) conclusion that although courts in free and democratic societies are obliged to provide open access to records of court proceedings and outcomes, this obligation—both online and off—does not necessarily extend to all information that is presently included in these records. This means either that a great deal of personal information could be excised from records without violence to courts’ purposes, or there are reasons driving current practices that have not fully been acknowledged. Both alternatives are in critical need of further exploration.