International Law

Upheaval in the Sovereign Debt Market: The Argentinean Story (Part 2)

[Editor’s Note:  This article is a continuation of yesterday’s post.]

Ripple Effects in Restructuring Sovereign Debt:

Although the ruling in NML Capital v. Argentina only binds the Second Circuit, the sovereign debt market will feel the ripples of the district court and Second Circuit’s rulings, especially because of New York’s prominence as a financial center and because many sovereign debt contracts are governed by New York law.  The exact effects of the courts’ decisions are hard to discern until the dust settles.  For instance, following the courts’ decisions, bond issuers have included a warning of the uncertainty surrounding the meaning and interpretation of the pari passu clause in bond offering brochures.  Paraguay, one of many sovereigns to include warnings in its offering information, has notified investors of the following:

“In ongoing litigation in federal courts in New York captioned NML Capital, LTD. v. Republic of Argentina, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that ranking clause in bonds issued by Argentina prevents Argentina from making payments in respect of the bonds unless it makes pro rata payments in respect of defaulted debt that ranks pari passu with the performing bonds.  The judgment has been appealed.

“We cannot predict when or in what form a final appellate decisions will be granted. Depending on the scope of the final decision, a final decision what requires ratable payments could potentially hinder or impede future sovereign debt restructuring and distress debt management unless sovereign issuers obtain the requisite creditor consents under their debt pursuant to a collective action clause such as the collective action clause contained in the Bonds, if applicable, or otherwise. . .  [We] cannot predict whether or in what manner the courts will resolve the dispute or how any such judgment will be applied or implemented.”

Historically, the restructuring of bonds involves negotiations between the external creditors and the sovereign. Deals struck during negotiations are not always able to placate all participants–resulting in holdout creditors.  Additionally, some creditors sell their bonds at a discount in the secondary market to vulture funds, purchasers of distressed securities who seek full payment of the bonds.  Holdout bondholders, including vulture funds, have the option to seek legal recourse and compel full payment.  Conventionally, sovereigns may not formally subordinate payments due to holdout bondholders when issuing newly restructured bonds but may instead delay payments on the nonrestructured bonds while intending to or actually paying on restructured bonds.  Under the Second Circuit’s broad interpretation of the pari passu clause, a sovereign’s informal subordination of bond payments to holdout bondholders may result in a contractual default under the pari passu clause.

The courts’ rulings have injected a new level of risk into the sovereign debt markets.  The pro rata payment requirements ordered by the district court and recently affirmed by the Second Circuit make it more difficult for sovereigns to restructure external debt contracts with pari passu clauses that parallel the language of the pari passu clause in the FAA.  Fundamentally, the courts’ rulings have provided external creditors with additional means of recourse against sovereigns, especially those able to satisfy payment obligations but who refuse to do so.  Because of the absence of an international bankruptcy regime, holdout bondholders have limited recourse against a defaulting sovereign.  The primary incentive for a sovereign to pay holdout bondholders is to maintain the sovereign’s access to international capital markets and, to a lesser degree, to avoid “harassment” from holdout bondholders.  The courts’ broad interpretation of the pari passu clause, however, has provided holdout bondholders with additional leverage to argue for full payment on distressed securities.

The increased protection for creditors comes at a cost to those bondholders willing to restructure bond payments.  The holdout bondholders will free ride on the bondholders who accept the haircut on the original bonds.  The Argentinian restructure dealt with the freeriding problem through a law prohibiting higher payments to holdout bondholders.  The courts’ rulings, however, hold that such a law violates the FAA’s pari passu clause.

If courts carry over the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pari passu clause to corporate bonds, the consequences may be more pronounced.  A broad interpretation of pari passu clause under corporate bonds may result in a perverse incentive for creditors.  Such an interpretation incentivizes creditors to refuse to allow an insolvent business to make ordinary business payments in order to gain bargaining power against other creditors.  This may result in a premature dissolution of the business.  Consequently, creditors may not be able to support debtor’s business if just one creditor objects.

The possible blowback because of a broad interpretation to the pari passu clause has not convinced all sovereigns to drop the “payor” language in pari passu clauses in its bond contracts.  Professor Mitu Gulati, a Duke Law professor, has compiled a list of sovereign bond offerings that show no significant changes from the boilerplate pari passu clause used in Argentina’s FAA.  The list of countries includes Ivory Coast, Serbia, Mongolia, Costa Rica and Ukraine.  Some have speculated that sovereigns may feel safe because the clause only becomes important if the economy implodes–a small, tail-end risk for some, because the sovereign does not want to be associated with novelty by changing the pari passu clause and because the collective action clauses in the sovereign’s bond contracts are sufficiently strong.  Others argue that collective action clauses will not prevent the holdout issue seen in NML Capital v. Argentina.  English law governs the bond contracts of Ukraine and Serbia.  English courts have not adopted the views of the U.S. courts and it remains to be seen how this ruling will affect them.

Conclusion:

It is unclear how the ruling in NML Capital v. Argentina will affect the sovereign debt market.  Recent sovereign debt offerings have noted the risk and uncertainty surrounding the Second Circuit’s rulings, though many sovereign bond contracts preserve the boilerplate pari passu language used in Argentina’s bond contract.  What is clear is that there is a real risk that Argentina will default on bonds issued under the FAA as a result of this decision.

Upheaval in the Sovereign Debt Market: The Argentinean Story (Part 1)

On October 26, sovereign debt markets felt the shock of the Second Circuit’s ruling in the ongoing case of NML Capital v. Argentina.  The court rejected a narrow interpretation of the pari passu clause advanced by Argentina.  Under the narrow interpretation, a sovereign violates the pari passu clause if it formally or legally subordinates debt; instead, the court adopted a broader interpretation of the clause, holding that the clause prevents making payments to creditors of restructured notes and holding out creditors.  In addition to interpreting the pari passu clause broadly, the court also upheld a novel injunction issued by the district court requiring ratable payments for holdout bondholders of the 2005 and 2010 Argentinian debt swaps.  

This article will first describe the events leading up to the Second Circuit’s ruling in NML Capital v. Argentina.  The next section will focus on the legal conclusions of the Southern District of New York (“S.D.N.Y”) and the Second Circuit.  Finally, this article will provide high-level analysis of the fallout of the Second Circuit’s ruling.

The 2005 and 2010 Haircut:

The Argentinian bond saga begins in 1994, when Argentina began originating debt securities under the Fiscal Agency Agreement (the agreement will hereafter be referred to as “FAA” and debt instruments created by the FAA as the “Bonds”).  The Bonds had a coupon rate ranging from 9.75 percent to 15.5 percent and maturity ranging from April 2005 to September 2031.  The FAA contained a pari passu clause, standard in international sovereign bond agreements.  Simply stated, a pari passu clause places all bondholders on equal footing–that is, protects bond payment obligations from subordination.

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BCLBE Russian Market Conference: Cross-Border Investment

Earlier this month, the Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy hosted its latest conference on the “Russian Market: Legal and Business Perspectives.”  The Network extensively covered the series of speakers and panel talks, with special attention to its IP and innovation topics.  This post considers international investment in the Russian market.

Panelists Michael Sanders and Ramsey Hanna discussed the Russian investment climate and the challenges of completing cross-border transactions.  Specifically, Sanders and Ramsey analyzed the joint venture between RUSANO and Domain Associates to highlight the business culture challenges of completing cross-border investment transactions with Russian firms.  In March 2012, RUSANO, a Russian open joint stock company, and Domain Associates (“Domain”), a U.S. venture capital firm, entered into an investment agreement.  Pursuant to the agreement, the parties agreed to jointly invest in emerging life sciences technology companies, foster transfer of technology into Russia, and establish pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities in the country.  Sanders and Ramsey noted the importance of building trust and confidence between RUSANO and Domain.  That is, successfully negotiating the joint venture’s terms required developing good working relationships between the parties’ legal teams and those individuals charged with structuring their partnership.

Conducting business with firms from different markets is not without its challenges.  Russian firms employ different negotiation tactics and the negotiation process can be lengthy and detailed.  As the director of a US pharmaceutical firm wrote, “Russia is a great place to operate – you can really build a strong, profitable business here – but there are no shortcuts.”  In negotiating the RUSANO-Domain joint venture, the parties dealt with the counter-effects of corruption.  To be sure, there is tendency among Russian firms to focus on procedure and formalities.  In the face of corruption and bribery, honest Russian firms strive for transparency and can be “methodical to a fault.”  The “rigid business culture” in Russia can be contrasted with the more “nimble start-up culture” present among Silicon Valley firms.

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BCLBE Russian Market Conference: The Innovation Aspect

In a follow up to a previous post, an interesting aspect of the “Russian Market: Legal and Business Perspectives” symposium was the panelists’ discussion of Russia’s treatment of domestic and foreign businesses—and argument that it is a large stop sign for many investors.  Consequently, the oil-focused government has for years ignored one of its chief assets—the country’s young science and technology innovators.  Educated in traditionally math-heavy state schools and inspired by the successes of Sergey Brin and Arkady Volozh, they too are ready to innovate.  This undervalued science and technology talent has attracted many Indian and Chinese investors to explore Russia, and these investments have proven to be lucrative.

The panelists agreed that Russian entrepreneurs tend to generate highly original proposals.  “Russians don’t usually pitch yet another social network idea,” observed Stephanie Marrus, Director of the Entrepreneurship Center at UCSF.  Building on her comment, Axel Tillman, CEO of RVC-USA, shared an example of how a small team of Russian engineers, within days, developed a commercially-viable way of avoiding a costly energy distribution inefficiency in the elevator industry, which many others thought permanent and inevitable.

The panelists also discussed how Russian entrepreneurs tend to have a can-do attitude and a strong confidence in their own ability to overcome obstacles to innovation.  While valuable in many respects, these tendencies, if unchecked, can result in delays and frustrations even for entrepreneurs themselves, as they attempt to accomplish unfamiliar business tasks on their own, often without consulting an expert even when one is available.  The resulting delays can be highly damaging for the outlook of a business, both in the short- and long-term future.

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Saudi Arabia’s Real-Estate Finance Laws

In July 2012, Saudi Arabia witnessed the official launch of the real-estate finance industry as part of the country’s economic financial development plans.  To promote the local competition between banking and other financial sectors, and the economy’s overall global competitiveness, non-banking corporations may now finance real estate in Saudi Arabia.

The Real Estate Development Fund (“REDF”) is the country’s main provider of housing finance.  REDF was unable to meet the rapidly increasing demand, while other real estate financing was limited due to absence of a well-structured regulatory framework.  For example, the industry lacked effective land registries and foreclosure regulations for properties in default.  Individual real estate financing was done against the transfer of title deeds rather than as an official mortgage.  In addition, lenders have been conservative with their loan standards, resulting in a low mortgage penetration rates.

Making mortgages available to public will address the imbalances occurring in the market with supply twisted to the high end.  The new Saudi laws tackle the chronic shortage of home ownership, particularly in the affordable middle- and lower-end markets.  More financing opportunities are needed, even though additional time may be required for the market to safely adopt such laws.

These laws are tools to open safe and continuous investment channels.  They encourage national economy leaders to diversify income sources and create job opportunities and investments in the country.  They also satisfy growing demands for appropriate and safe housing offers.  These steps aim to develop mechanisms that preserve homeownership rights, while stimulating financial institutions to lend more frequently, reduce the cost of mortgage financing and provide differentiated products for multiple segments of society.

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LIBOR Consultation Document Opened

In response to the recent LIBOR scandal, Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, has opened a consultation document on the continuing viability of the benchmark rate.  The move is unsurprising to many observers of European financial markets, where multi-state collaboration is essential to the outcome’s perceived legitimacy.  As mentioned in a previous post, U.S. CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler recently commented on the LIBOR’s future.  The issue is undisputedly important, as rate manipulations may seriously impact market integrity, result in significant losses to consumers and investors, and distort the real economy.  The consultation document, which will be open through November 15, follows an initial legislative proposal period, and sets the stage for the EU’s final response to widespread concerns regarding LIBOR.  This post will discuss the now-completed proposal process, newly adopted amendments, and the European Commission’s response to persistent criticisms and concerns.

On July 25, 2012, the European Commission adopted amendments to the proposal for a Regulation and a Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation.  The long-awaited initial legislative proposal to revise the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”) was made on October 20, 2011.  The original MiFID came into force in November 2007—intended to enhance investor protection, improve cross-border market access, and promote competition in the financial markets across the EU.  Although MiFID has arguably achieved some of these aims, many commentators have suggested that the system ought to better reflect the lessons learned from the financial crisis and developments in the markets.

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Dr. Joachim Rosengarten Presents the Challenges of Acquiring a German Company

Thinking about buying a Volkswagen car? What about buying Volkswagen the company? On November 1st , BCLBE hosted a talk by Dr. Joachim Rosengarten of Hengeler Mueller, who guided listeners though the process by which a U.S. corporation acquires a German company. Dr. Rosengarten, who had attended Boalt Hall as an LL.M. student, shed light on the patchwork of laws governing international mergers and acquisitions by proposing and then analyzing a hypothetical acquisition of a German company by a U.S. operation.

Dr. Rosengarten’s lesson can be broken down into three rules: know the laws, get the stocks, and get the price right. The first challenge in acquiring a German corporation is to understand the applicable laws that will govern the purchase. German shareholders want the best deal if their company is to be purchased by a foreigner. German law applies to the acquisition, which is overseen by BaFin, the German equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Moreover, once an investor or corporation owns just a two percent share of a German company, it must disclose its stake to regulators and the public. (more…)