A few weeks ago, eighteen law professors, including Berkeley Law Professor Robert Bartlett, filed an amicus brief in support of respondents in the pending Supreme Court case, Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Retirement Plans and Trust Funds. Before the Court is whether plaintiffs using a “fraud-on-the-market” theory of reliance in a securities fraud (10b-5) class action must prove the “materiality” of alleged misstatements at the class certification stage. The brief argues that the histories of FRCP Rule 23 and the fraud-on-the-market presumption show that plaintiffs do not.
Under FRCP Rule 23, plaintiffs in a securities class action are required to show that the elements of a rule 10b-5 claim, including reliance, are common to the class. Reliance typically is shown through invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption. The presumption, as articulated in the Supreme Court case Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, is based on the theory that most publicly available information is reflected in a stock’s price. Thus, a company’s public material misstatements are reflected in the price at which investors bought the security. “[A]n investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed.” The Court went on to state that materiality is an objective standard, “involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.” The Court did not hold, however, whether a showing of materiality is required to invoke the presumption. (more…)